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REINVIGORATING THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL
COMPETITION THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE AND FTC V. STERIS
CORP.
Henry S. Klimowicz
Basic economic theory states that markets and consumers are usually
best served when there is vigorous competition in a free market, with
competitors battling over price and quality. For this reason, antitrust law
recognizes the preservation of competition as its primary goal.1 During the
1960s and 1970s,2 antitrust enforcement agencies responded to an increase
in merger activity by challenging many transactions under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.3 The newly recognized potential competition doctrine was an
effective legal tool upon which the agencies relied in non-horizontal merger
cases before the Supreme Court. It has been forty-three years since the
Supreme Court last ruled on a potential competition case, however, and their
less-than-clear-precedent on the subject has led to lower courts crafting
difficult and inconsistent standards. In FTC v. Steris, a district court in Ohio
recently rejected the government’s potential competition argument, finding
that a merger between two of the largest firms in the already concentrated
contract sterilization industry4 did not violate Section 7. Despite being the
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1
Mission, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission (last visited Apr. 10,
2018) (“The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity by
promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace. Competition in a free market benefits
American consumers through lower prices, better quality and greater choice. Competition
provides businesses the opportunity to compete on price and quality, in an open market and
on a level playing field, unhampered by anticompetitive restraints. Competition also tests and
hardens American companies at home, the better to succeed abroad.”).
2
See generally Thomas M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories on the
Rise of Conglomerate Mergers in the 1960s, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 185 (2006).
3
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). Section 7 of the Clayton Act deems a merger or acquisition
unlawful if it may “substantially lessen competition.” Id. The Federal Trade Commission
and Department of Justice are the two main federal agencies who file antitrust challenges.
4
The contract sterilization industry consists of companies that contract with
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only sub-theory under the potential competition doctrine endorsed by the
Supreme Court, the FTC did not argue its case under the perceived potential
competition theory. Instead, the decision hinged on a single element under
the actual competition theory—a sub-theory with higher evidentiary burdens
and without explicit Supreme Court approval. Unsurprisingly, the court
concluded that the FTC did not carry its evidentiary burden under the actual
potential competition theory. It is unclear why the FTC chose not to raise
the perceived potential competition doctrine. If agencies continue to forgo
this theory, however, the sustained allowance of non-horizontal mergers will
pose new threats to U.S. markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
As industries become more concentrated, consumers are increasingly
threatened by the prospect of monopolistic behavior due to the reduction of
competition.5
Antitrust enforcement agencies seek to prevent this
occurrence by prohibiting certain merger or acquisition transactions that may
have this effect; however, these transactions can provide significant
procompetitive benefits.6 A merger, for instance, may benefit consumers
and markets by augmenting innovation and efficiencies among the
participating firms.7 But when these transactions occur in concentrated
markets, they pose enhanced risks to competition.8 Congress addressed this
concern long ago by enacting the Clayton Act in 1914, as amended by the
Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950.9
manufacturers to rid their products of unwanted microorganisms. See FTC v. Steris Corp.,
133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 96364 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
5
See generally Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries
Becoming More Concentrated?, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=26120
47 (last updated Oct. 27, 2018) (“More than 75% of U.S. industries have experienced an
increase in concentration levels over the last two decades. . . . Lax enforcement of antitrust
regulations and increasing technological barriers to entry appear to be important factors
behind this trend. . . . Overall, our findings suggest that the nature of U.S. product markets
has undergone a structural shift that has weakened competition.”).
6
Competition Guidance for Antitrust Law, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2018).
7
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 29
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf
(explaining the benefits that merger transactions can provide) (“Nevertheless, a primary
benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant economic
efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may
result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”) [hereinafter
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES].
8
Concentrated markets are harmful for competition and the DOJ recognizes this. See
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
9
The original Clayton Act only prohibited the acquisition of “stock.” 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2012). The Celler-Kefauver Act amended the Clayton Act to include horizontal mergers.
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act (“Section 7”) deems mergers and
acquisitions unlawful where the effect “may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”10 Congress conferred
enforcement authority of Section 7 to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and Department of Justice (DOJ).11 Section 7 not only covers mergers
between competitors in the same market (“horizontal” mergers), but also
those effectuated by non-competitors in different markets (“non-horizontal”
mergers).12 Historically, “potential competition” was a doctrine raised in
cases involving non-horizontal mergers. 13 Today, it is also a concept that
can be pertinent in horizontal mergers.14
Antitrust enforcement agencies, the Supreme Court, and a handful of
circuit courts have recognized the role that the potential competition doctrine
plays in preserving competition.15 Agencies often seek to protect competition
under the potential competition doctrine—in both the future and present—
by respectively employing the actual potential competition and perceived
potential competition theories.16
The Supreme Court, however, has only adopted the perceived potential
competition theory. Still, the country’s highest judicial body has not made it
easy for the FTC to succeed. It has been over forty years since the Court has

Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18).
10
15 U.S.C. § 18.
11
Todd N. Hutchison, Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and the FTC,
A.B.A, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_
practice_series/understanding_differences/ (“The DOJ and FTC share authority to enforce the
Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.). See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (FTC authority); id. § 25
(DOJ authority). Each agency typically takes the lead in reviewing mergers within certain
industries to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. § 18. Although there may be some
overlap, the DOJ and FTC tend to allocate merger reviews according to their respective
expertise. For example, the DOJ typically investigates mergers in the Financial Services,
Telecommunications, and Agricultural Industries; the FTC typically investigates mergers in
the Defense, Pharmaceutical, and Retail Industries.”).
12
Note that Non-Horizontal Mergers are now included under the same umbrella as
“Horizontal Mergers” pursuant to the newest DOJ guidelines. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 7.
13
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1984), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines (separate
designations between “non-horizontal” mergers and “horizontal mergers”) [hereinafter 1984
GUIDELINES]; but see 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7 (where all mergers are viewed
under the category of “horizontal mergers.”).
14
See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
15
See generally Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Doctrine of Potential Competition as
Basis for Finding Violation of § 7 of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 412 (1979).
16
Id. at 2. The actual potential competition doctrine seeks to prevent the removal of
future economic benefits, whereas the perceived potential competition doctrine seeks to
preserve present economic benefits. See also 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.
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last ruled on such a case,17 and antitrust law has since shifted towards a more
defendant-friendly agenda.18 Consequently, lower courts have taken it upon
themselves to craft different and often heightened standards under the
doctrine.19 This has substantially detracted from the FTC’s ability to
prioritize which types of firms deserve the title of “potential competitor.”
Part II of this Comment will first attempt to explain the rationale and
purpose underlying the potential competition doctrine in a coherent,
understandable manner. Part III will then use Supreme Court precedent to
show how the potential competition doctrine has developed over time. Part
IV will then critique the Supreme Court’s approach, asking whether the
Court’s test truly captures what the potential competition doctrine seeks to
accomplish. Parts V & VI will then focus on the Steris decision, arguing that
the FTC may have increased its chances of success had it relied on the
perceived potential competition theory rather than the actual potential
competition theory.
II. THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE: THE PERCEIVED
POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY AND THE ACTUAL POTENTIAL
COMPETITION THEORY
A. The Potential Competition Doctrine, Generally.
The potential competition doctrine addresses mergers between noncompetitors, which are commonly referred to as “non-horizontal mergers.”20
Although less susceptible to antitrust scrutiny than “horizontal mergers”
(those between competitors),21 government agencies still recognize the

17

The last Supreme Court ruling on a potential competition case was in United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
18
See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 453 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that
antitrust enforcement agencies shifted to loose enforcement after the institution of the merger
guidelines in the 1980’s).
19
See Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1058 (2007) (“It is unsurprising then to find that lower courts have
only contributed to the confusion in this area by creating a number of different and conflicting
factors to evaluate claims that the acquisition of a potential competitor will violate section 7.
Worse still, in some cases, the courts appear to have disregarded what little guidance the
Supreme Court has provided them. And, many courts have become very skeptical of such
claims entirely.”) (footnotes omitted).
20
Id. at 1081 n.355 (“In affirmative cases asserting the potential competitor doctrine, the
1984 Guidelines remain in force. As the DOJ and FTC explained upon the release of the 1992
Guidelines: ‘guidance on non-horizontal mergers is provided in Section 4 of the Department’s
1984 Merger Guidelines, read in the context of today’s revisions to the treatment of horizontal
mergers.’”) (citations omitted)).
21
1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at § 4 (“Although non-horizontal mergers are less
likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems, they are not invariably
innocuous.”).
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negative effects that non-horizontal mergers can pose on competition.22
Specifically, agencies address the future effects a non-horizontal merger may
have on competition by employing the actual potential competition theory.23
Generally, this theory states that the transaction removes the possibility that
the two firms would have competed within the same market in the future.24
When arguing a potential competition case, agencies often also seek to
protect the present procompetitive effects a non-horizontal merger may have
by employing the perceived potential competition theory.25 This theory
states that a given transaction may remove present procompetitive influences
that the acquired firm has on the target market, which stems from the target
market’s perceptions of the acquired firm’s ability to enter the target
market.26 Thus, the sub-theories’ respectively focus on whether the acquired
firm had an actual or perceived ability to enter the acquiring firm’s market.
At first glance, these two theories may seem complex and
intimidating—especially for those not familiar with antitrust law.27 In order
to alleviate some of this confusion, this Comment will now further explain
the basic rationale and frameworks underlying these two theories and
specifically, why their convoluted legal substance has broad implications for
agencies when bringing a potential competition case.
1. The Actual Potential Competition Theory: An
Objective Standard
Consider Outback Steakhouse (Outback), a business that largely
competes with other sit-down restaurants within the casual dining market.28
22
Id. (“[N]on-horizontal mergers involve firms that do not operate in the same market.
It necessarily follows that such mergers produce no immediate change in the level of
concentration in any relevant market . . . non-horizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal
mergers to create competitive problems . . . . In some circumstances, the non-horizontal
merger of a firm already in a market (the ‘acquired firm’) with a potential entrant to that
market . . . may adversely affect competition.”) (footnotes omitted).
23
Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1046 (“The competitive effect from actual potential
competition occurs in the future.”).
24
Id.
25
Id. (stating “[w]hen the transaction or conduct is aimed at a potential competitor that
is constraining market prices or having some other current, ongoing procompetitive effect,
courts apply the perceived potential competition doctrine. For example, courts find that
perceived potential competition is present when competitors in a highly concentrated market
are aware of the potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a more competitive
manner to perhaps deter that firm’s entry.”).
26
Id. See generally William E. Dorigan: The Potential Competition Doctrine: The
Justice Department’s Antitrust Weapon under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 8 J. MARSHALL J.
PRAC. & PROC. 415 (1975).
27
Even for those who are familiar with antitrust law, the theory still tends to garner
confusion. See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1089 (stating “[t]he language of the tests set
out in the 1984 Guidelines and the 1992 Guidelines also creates some confusion . . . .”).
28
See The Boulder Group, The Net Lease Casual Dining Market Report (Q1 2018),
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Outback can therefore be said to reside on the edge of the drive-through fastfood market since such is in close proximity to Outback’s casual dining
market.29 Now, imagine that Outback is financially capable of expanding
into the fast-food market, and is intent on doing so because of the high prices
that fast-food restaurants charge. Executives at McDonald’s recognize this
probable expansion by Outback and begin to fear that the move will detract
from McDonald’s own sales by making its market more competitive. In an
effort to avoid competing with Outback in the future, McDonald’s takes the
low-road initiative and successfully executes a merger agreement with
Outback.30 As a result, instead of having a new competitor in the fast-food
market (which would likely pressure the fast-food giants to lower prices), the
fast-food market ends up with a larger, more powerful McDonald’s—a
company that can continue to charge high prices. This example attempts to
neatly portray why antitrust law and federal agencies have used the actual
potential competition theory to challenge certain non-horizontal mergers that
seem to remove the possibility of lower prices in the future.
Now apply the previous hypothetical to a more formalized definition:
the actual potential competition theory is premised on the notion that the
acquired firm (Outback) may produce future procompetitive benefits in the
acquiring firm’s market (the drive through fast-food industry) if it were not
for the merger.31 In other words, the actual potential competition theory
seeks to prevent non-horizontal mergers, where transactions involve an
acquired firm that is “likely” to soon enter the acquiring firm’s market.32
Agencies accordingly use the actual potential competition theory to target
transactions that involve acquired firms, which have the actual ability and
https://bouldergroup.com/media/pdf/2018-Q1-Net-Lease-Casual-Dining-ResearchReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (listing financial statistics about Outback Steakhouse
and other restaurants within the “casual dining market,” such as Hooters, Chili’s, and Red
Lobster).
29
For purposes of this Comment, “close proximity” means that the two markets are
somewhat similar. “Market proximity,” however, is a legal term that attempts to portray the
similarity of markets in objective terms. Joseph F. Brodley, The Potential Competition
Doctrine Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. L. REV. 376, 389–401 (1983) (“Proximity is
determined by: (1) the similarity between the two markets in terms of critical entry
characteristics, such as production, marketing, technology, and transactional relations; and (2)
actual observed entry between the two markets, or from the outside market into a market
closely similar to the inside market. If according to these criteria the proximity between
markets is close, it can be presumed that the acquiring firm has an entry advantage.”).
30
Scienter on the part of McDonald’s is not required under the actual potential
competition theory; however, for the sake of this example, consider that such is present.
31
See Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1362–86 (1965). This author actually endorses the actual competition
theory, but also discusses how many critique the theory as well.
32
Id. This may be done by either “de novo entry,” where a firm independently enters a
market, or by “toe hold acquisition,” where a firm acquires a small firm in the market in order
to gain entry.
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intent to enter the market of the acquiring firm, prior to the merger.33
These types of transactions therefore raise red flags for antitrust
agencies. In their joint guidelines, the FTC and DOJ state: “[b]y eliminating
the possibility of entry by the acquiring firm in a more procompetitive
manner, the merger could result in a lost opportunity for improvement in
market performance resulting from the addition of a significant
competitor.”34
Make sense? Well, in the context of Section 7, the Supreme Court is
unsure. The country’s highest judicial body has not adopted the theory35 and
as a result, neither have all federal courts.36 This widespread absence of
approval is largely due to the commonly-held view that the theory is
inconsistent with plain-reading interpretations of Section 7.37 Namely,
critics claim that since the language of Section 7 prohibits only mergers that
threaten to reduce present competition, the law should not bar mergers that
take away the potential for increased competition in the future.38 Still, the
theory has garnered lower court approval on account that enforcement
agencies consistently raise it in the cases they bring.39 Therefore, many
courts adjudicate actual potential competition issues,40 albeit in the absence

33

Id.
1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 25.
35
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
36
The Eighth Circuit has approved of the doctrine, as have the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits. See Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1981); Ekco Products
Co. v. Federal Trade Com., 347 F.2d 745, 752–53 (7th Cir. 1965); Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 74–79 (10th Cir. 1972). “Other circuits, including the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, and District of Columbia have not decided the issue. A number of lower courts
have utilized the doctrine in hearing Section 7 challenges to mergers.” 2 CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 10.02 (2018).
37
On its face, Section 7 does not require a company to take the action most likely to
make a market more competitive; Section 7 simply proscribes certain acts that may
substantially decrease competition. Another objection to the actual potential competition
theory is that if market forces are to be relied on to create consumer satisfaction, the
presumption should be that the decision of a firm to enter a market by merger is the best and
most efficient choice. See CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS, supra note 36; see also
Turner, supra note 31, at 1362–86.
38
See, e.g., DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST 235 (1972); Stanley
D. Robinson, Recent Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (1975); Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 323–24
(1975). But see Turner, supra note 31, at 1383 (“[T]here is a rather modest case for prohibiting
a merger between a firm that would clearly enter the market by internal expansion and a
leading or growing established firm in a tight oligopoly.”).
39
See generally FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 966 (N.D. Ohio 2015)
(acknowledging that although the Supreme Court has not endorsed the actual potential
competition doctrine, it will be accepted by the Court because the FTC recognizes its validity).
40
E.g., id.
34
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of clear Supreme Court precedent.41 This is problematic for lower courts
that adjudicate actual potential competition issues since these courts are
seemingly free to develop their own standards without pushback.
The only potential guidance influencing lower court standards stems
from statements the Supreme Court gave in dicta.42 In United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court suggested that the following
preconditions must be met if an argument concerning the actual potential
competition theory were to prevail:
(i)
The target market must be concentrated;
(ii)
The acquiring firm must have feasible means for entering
the market other than by making the challenged
acquisition, that is, by de novo entry or entry by foothold
or toe hold acquisition;43 and
(iii)
Those means must offer a substantial likelihood of
ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or
other significant precompetitive effects.44
Following the Court’s holding in Marine Bancorporation, many lower
courts have remained skeptical of the actual potential competition doctrine
since the Supreme Court ultimately failed to explicitly endorse the theory.45
Other courts, however, have heightened element two— the theory’s hallmark
element—by requiring the FTC to show by “certain proof” that the acquired
firm was likely to enter the acquiring firm’s market.46
2. The Perceived Potential Competition Theory
In returning to Outback, it is safe to say that companies within the fastfood market are vigilant of companies like Outback, which reside on the edge
of the drive-through fast-food industry. And it logically follows that
McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King want to avoid potential competition
with new fast-food chains. In an effort to dissuade Outback from believing
that its transition will be profitable, these fast-food chains may be
incentivized to constrain the prices of their food. Preserving this preemptive, procompetitive behavior of target market firms is the goal of

41

The Supreme Court has addressed the actual potential competition doctrine but has not
endorsed it. See generally, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602
(1974). Therefore, the Supreme Court has not explicitly approved a framework or analysis for
the actual potential competition doctrine.
42
See Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633.
43
This is the element at issue in FTC v. Steris, which will be discussed infra Parts V and
VI.
44
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633.
45
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46
See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293–95 (4th Cir. 1977).
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agencies under the perceived potential competition theory.47
The perceived potential competition theory recognizes that by simply
residing “in the wings” of the fast-food industry, Outback can exert a
present-procompetitive influence on the fast-food market without ever
entering.48 Compared to the actual potential competition theory, the benefits
on competition the perceived potential competition theory seeks to preserve
may exist notwithstanding the possibility that: (1) Outback may not actually
intend on ever entering the fast-food market, or (2) Outback may not even
be financially capable of entering the target market to begin with.49 Rather,
the beneficial effect the theory seeks to preserve is dependent on: (1) whether
firms in the target market (McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King)
subjectively perceive Outback as a company that may enter, and (2) if that
perception has a present-procompetitive effect on their behavior in the form
of lower prices.50
Courts refer to this effect as “the wings effect,”51 “the fringe effect,”
and “the edge effect.”52 But unlike the actual potential competition doctrine,
the Supreme Court has endorsed the perceived potential competition
doctrine as a valid legal principle.53 Still, however, few courts have barred
mergers on perceived potential competition grounds.54
The 1984 Merger Guidelines include a more formalized explanation of
the theory’s underlying rationale, in addition to the potential anticompetitive
effects of such a transaction:
By eliminating a significant present competitive threat that
constrains the behavior of the firms already in the market, the
merger could result in an immediate deterioration in market
performance. The Economic theory of limit pricing suggests that
47

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 625.
49
See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1046 (“[C]ourts find that perceived potential
competition is present when competitors in a highly concentrated market are aware of the
potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a more competitive manner to perhaps
deter that firm’s entry.”).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1042–43.
52
See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
53
See United States v. El Paso, 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
54
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. First Nat’l State Bancorporation,
499 F. Supp. 793 (D.N.J. 1980); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226,
1234, 1254–56 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d mem. sub nom. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States,
418 U.S. 906 (1974), reh’g denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974); In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C.
1174, 1273 (1979), aff’d sub nom. Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.
1981); In re Polypore Int’l, Inc., 2010 FTC LEXIS 97, at *72 n.41 (2010), concurring opinion
at 2010 FTC LEXIS 96 (2010), aff’d, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S.
917 (2013).
48
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monopolists and groups of colluding firms may find it profitable
to restrain their pricing in order to deter new entry.55
Under the Marine Bancorporation framework, to successfully invoke the
perceived potential competition doctrine, the FTC must show that: (i) the
acquired firm has the “characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive
to render it a perceived potential de novo entrant,” (ii) the target market is
substantially concentrated; and (iii) “the acquiring firm’s premerger
presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempted oligopolistic
behavior on the part of existing participants in that market.”56 A fourth
prerequisite, given in a later Supreme Court case, requires that there be few
other potential entrants.57
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE
PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE
The potential competition doctrine was first recognized as a legitimate
legal tool for antitrust enforcement in 1964 with the Supreme Court’s rulings
in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. and United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co.58 The historical milieu surrounding antitrust law during this
period is significant in that mostly all of the following cases were adjudicated
during the 1960s and 1970s—a period marked by enhanced merger
activity.59 Recognizing a spike in merger transactions, antitrust enforcement
agencies adopted aggressive anti-merger policies.60 The rationale applied by
the Court in the following two cases therefore portrays an economic
perspective that presumed harm to competition when faced with transactions
occurring in concentrated markets.61 Today, however, enforcement policies
are reluctant to make such an assumption as the legal landscape surrounding
55

See 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 24.
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S 602, 624–25 (1974)
(emphasis added).
57
See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973). This
requirement is usually bundled with element three, because if there are many potential
entrants, the perceptions of the acquired firm, specifically, will likely not have much of an
effect on the target market.
58
United States v. El Paso, 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,
378 U.S. 158 (1964).
59
See Hurley, supra note 2.
60
The Development of Antitrust Enforcement, CONST. RIGHTS FOUND. (Spring 2017),
http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-23-1-c-the-development-of-antitrustenforcement.html.
61
See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in
Horizontal
Merger
Enforcement,
22
ANTITRUST
29,
29
(2008),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8461/250e60730e6b78bc077a74073ac0717a1cf4.pdf
(arguing that merger enforcement during this time was overly stringent due to inflexible
standards which relied on the “structural presumption” of harm to competition from
increasing market concentration).
56
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mergers is more defendant-friendly.62
United States v. El Paso was the first Supreme Court case to address
the perceived potential competition theory.63 In El Paso, the merging firms
were both large players who sold gas in different Northwest states.64 The
acquiring firm, El Paso Natural Gas Co. (El Paso), was the only out-of-state
supplier in California.65 El Paso agreed to acquire Pacific Northwest
Pipeline (Pacific) after Pacific’s tentative plan to deliver oil in California was
terminated.66 Prior to the merger, Pacific Northwest was eager to enter the
California market but had not yet been successful.67
The Supreme Court ultimately barred the acquisition on potential
competition grounds without explicitly mentioning the doctrine by name.68
Specifically, the Court accepted the DOJ’s argument that the merger was
capable of substantially lessening competition since Pacific was a potential
supplier to the California market.69 The Court established a vague test for
determining whether the transaction harmed competition, stating that “[t]he
effect on competition in a particular market through [the] acquisition of
another company is determined by the nature or extent of that market and by
the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company’s eagerness to
enter that market, its resourcefulness, and so on.”70
Applying this test, the Court determined that Pacific Northwest was a
potential competitor that had a present-procompetitive effect on the
California market.71 Although not yet within the California market, the
Court determined that Pacific was a potential entrant since El Paso was the
only out-of-state supplier to California, and because Pacific Northwest was
“the only other important interstate pipeline west of the Rocky Mountains.”72

62
See GELLOHRN, supra note 18, at 533–34 (discussing the shift to loosen enforcement
after the institution of the merger guidelines in the 1980s).
63
El Paso, 376 U.S. at 655.
64
Id. at 653.
65
Id. at 652, 652 n.2. (stating that El Paso also supplied fifty percent of the state’s natural
gas).
66
Id. at 655.
67
Id. at 644–55.
68
Id. at 659. The Court did refer to Pacific Northwest as a “potential competitor” once
but did not generally speak of the potential competition doctrine as an established rule of law.
Id.
69
El Paso, 376 U.S. at 661.
70
Id. at 660. Because of the Court’s “and so on” inclusion, its list of factors is not
exhaustive. This allowed the possibility of more factors to be considered in later cases.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 658–59. The Court noted that this was evident after Pacific Northwest lost a bid
to enter the California market after El Paso subsequently made significant financial
concessions to prevail. Id. at 659.
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In its reasoning, the Court foreshadowed the driving principles behind
the perceived potential competition theory. The Court emphasized that the
purpose of Section 7 was “to arrest the trend toward concentration,
the tendency to monopoly, before the consumer’s alternatives disappeared
through merger.”73 The Court also noted that the natural gas industry was
extremely regulated at the time, meaning that there were high barriers of
entry for new entrants.74 The Court concluded its opinion by stating: “[w]e
would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific
Northwest to get into the California market, though unsuccessful, had a
powerful influence on El Paso’s business attitudes within the State.”75 Thus,
the most influential aspect was the fact that Pacific Northwest had regularly
attempted to enter the California market through the submission of bids,
which had a consequential effect on El Paso’s business decisions—
notwithstanding the fact that none of these bids were successful.76
In United States v. Penn-Olin, the Court expanded the applicability of
the potential competition doctrine.77 Prior to consummating a joint venture,
Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation (Pennsalt), did not distribute its sodiumchlorate product in a continually growing southeastern market.78 Olin
Mathieson Chemicals Corporation (Olin), a producer of similar chemicals,
agreed to serve as a distributor for Pennsalt’s product in the southeastern
market after the companies formed a joint venture.79 There had been no entry
into this heavily concentrated market in over a decade, but each company
had independently considered entering prior to their agreement.80

73

Id. at 659 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963)).
Id. at 659–60. High entry barriers are conditions that make it difficult for companies
to enter a given market, making their existence a concern for antitrust enforcement agencies.
See John B. Kirkwood & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Path to Profitability: Reinvigorating the
Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 39 (2009) (discussing agencies’
use of “entry barriers” and varying definitions).
75
El Paso, 376 U.S. at 659.
76
Scholars view this case as concerning perceived potential competition. See Bush &
Massa, supra note 19, at 1047–49. The Court, however, alludes to the notion that Pacific
Northwest was an “actual competitor” through its attempts to enter by bidding, stating that
“[u]nsuccessful bidders are no less competitors than the successful ones.” Id. at 1049 (citation
omitted).
77
378 U.S. 158 (1964). See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1050 (“The Penn-Olin case
also represented a distinct expansion of the doctrine. In El Paso, the potential entrant’s effect
on the market was through an unsuccessful bid. In contrast, Penn-Olin involved a joint
venture to produce and sell sodium chlorate between two firms: one firm never served the
geographic market that the joint venture would serve; the other never produced the chemical
that was the relevant product.”).
78
Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 161–62.
79
Id. Including the joint venture, the market consisted of only three firms. Id. at 163.
80
Id. at 164–66.
74
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The Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in applying the
potential competition doctrine by only considering, “as a matter of
probability [whether] both companies would have entered the market as
individual competitors if Penn-Olin had not been formed.”81 The Supreme
Court stated that the district court should have gauged whether there would
have been a wings effect if only one of the companies had decided to enter
the south eastern market.82 Realizing that this effect was too difficult to
gauge, the Court concluded that the agreement did not violate Section 7.83
The Court, however, still determined that both companies could be
considered potential competitors.84 This conclusion was based on the
companies’ resources, their diverse product lines, their compelling reasons
to enter the market, their respectable reputations, and their “know-how” as
established companies of how to effectively enter a new market.85
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin is important when considering the
type of firm that might pose the most anticompetitive risks when analyzing
the perceived potential competition theory.86 Specifically, the Court stated:
“[t]he existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed
corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting
anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be substantial incentive to
competition which cannot be underestimated.”87
The previous cases both recognize an important proposition under the
perceived potential competition theory. Namely, that: (1) courts should
endeavor to gauge the effects a potential competitor has by residing on the
wings of a given market, and (2) a showing of the acquiring firm’s intent to
enter the market of the acquired firm is extremely relevant when gauging if
the perceived potential competition theory should apply.88 The Court’s later
holding in 1967 demonstrates why actual intent of acquired firms is not
dispositive when determining whether present procompetitive benefits exist.

81

Id. at 172–73 (alteration in original).
Id. at 173 (“There still remained for consideration the fact that Penn-Olin eliminated
the potential competition of the corporation that might have remained at the edge of the
market, continually threatening to enter.”).
83
This was because the Court found that gauging the precise competitive effects in this
instance was “impossible to demonstrate.” Id. at 176. But see United States v. El Paso, 376
U.S. 651, 659 (1964) (where the court was able to directly show such through El Paso having
lowered its prices in response to Pacific Northwest’s bid attempts).
84
Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 175.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 174.
87
Id.
88
This inquiry is even more relevant when showing actual potential competition, or the
future anticompetitive effects that a transaction may have.
82
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In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., the Supreme Court ultimately barred
Procter & Gamble’s (Procter) acquisition of Clorox on perceived potential
competition grounds.89 Procter was a producer and distributor of a wide
variety of household cleaning items, which, prior to the proposed acquisition,
did not include bleach.90 Clorox, the acquired firm, was an exclusive
manufacturer of bleach and controlled fifty percent of an extremely
concentrated industry.91
The lower court found that Procter was not a potential competitor since
it had no intent, nor had made any past attempt to enter the bleach market.92
Despite finding that Procter did not intend to enter the liquid bleach market,
the Supreme Court reversed and found that Procter was a potential
competitor.93 The Court made this conclusion based largely on Procter’s
advantageous positioning in the adjacent, household cleaning-product
market.94 Probative to the Court’s finding that Procter was the “most likely
entrant” to the liquid bleach market were the facts that Procter sold similar
goods, was engaged in a program to diversify its product lines, had
substantial advantages in advertisement and merchandising, retained
experienced managers who marketed similar goods, and could feasibly build
an efficient plant at a reasonable cost.95 The Court also found that Procter
had acquired Clorox for the purpose of gaining a greater share of the market
than it could have attained had it entered independently.96
The Court also placed heightened importance on the plethora of
potential anticompetitive effects the merger could have had if effectuated. It
stated that: (1) removing Procter from the market would eradicate the present
procompetitive effects that Procter had on the liquid bleach market by
waiting in the wings;97 and (2) that the acquisition would deter new entry
among smaller firms considering entering the liquid bleach market since they
would not want to compete with the larger, newly merged Procter.98
89

386 U.S. 568 (1967).
Id. at 572.
91
Id. at 570–71.
92
Id. at 580.
93
See id.
94
Id.
95
Procter, 386 U.S. at 581.
96
Id.
97
Id. The Court determined that Procter, in fact, had an effect on the market behavior of
participants in the liquid bleach industry since it viewed Procter as one that might begin
producing bleach. Id. The Court, however, did not gauge the price effect that would arise
from the elimination of Procter as a perceived potential entrant. Id.; see also United States v.
Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (finding that doing so was impossible).
98
Procter, 386 U.S. at 581; see Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1053 (stating “the
acquisition might discourage smaller firms considering entering the market, or already on the
fringe”). In stating that “[f]ew firms would have the temerity to challenge a firm as solidly
90
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Six years later, the Supreme Court gave a more complete analysis of
the perceived potential competition doctrine in United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.99 In Falstaff, the United States challenged a merger between
Falstaff Brewing Company and Narragansett Brewing Company.100 Prior to
the merger, Falstaff was one of the ten largest brewing companies in the
U.S.101 Falstaff had not sold its products in the New England market prior
to the merger, but publicly expressed interest in doing so on multiple
occasions.102 Instead of eventually entering de novo, however, Falstaff
decided to purchase Narragansett—a company that held a twenty percent
share of the New England market.103
The government employed the potential competition doctrine and
argued that the transaction may substantially lessen competition in the New
England market because: (1) Falstaff was a “potential entrant”; and (2) the
acquisition eliminated competition that would have existed had Falstaff
entered the market de novo.104 The district court rejected this contention and
permitted the transaction, reasoning that Falstaff could not successfully enter
the New England market de novo or through a toe-hold acquisition; it had to
be by the acquisition of a larger brewery already in the region, such as
Narragansett.105
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court did not rely on the
finding that Falstaff lacked the actual capability of successfully entering the
market on its own. Rather, the Court reinforced its holding in Procter, and
stated that the district court had “failed to give separate consideration to
whether Falstaff was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so
positioned on the edge of the market that it exerted beneficial influence on
competitive conditions in that market.”106 Specifically, the Supreme Court
insisted that such an inquiry should be centered not on the internal decisions

entrenched as Clorox,” the Court suggested that smaller firms will have even fewer incentives
to enter a market dominated by an established incumbent (Clorox) that is owned by a large
conglomerate with significant resources. Proctor, 386 U.S. at 581. Thus, the Court reasoned
that the transaction would create, or increase, barriers to entry in the bleach market for smaller
firms, perhaps significantly limiting the number of perceived potential entrants to only larger
firms. See id. at 578.
99
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 551.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 528 (stating that this twenty percent market share was expected to increase).
104
Id. at 529. Note that not all acquisitions raise Section 7 concerns. For instance, if
Falstaff decided to purchase a company that held a smaller percentage of the New England
market than Narragansett, it is probable that such a transaction would not have raised the same
level of antitrust concerns.
105
Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 530.
106
Id. at 532–33.
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of Falstaff executives, but on whether, “given its financial capabilities and
conditions in the New England market, it would be reasonable to consider
[Falstaff] a potential entrant into that market.”107 The Court ultimately
remanded the decision to the lower court to determine whether Falstaff could
be said to influence existing competition as a potential competitor on the
fringe of a market.108
Considering that the lower court already found that Falstaff was
incapable of entering independently,109 this case shows the importance the
Supreme Court gives to showings of a wings effect when posed with
arguments under the perceived potential competition theory. Thus, in both
Falstaff and Procter, the Court did not narrowly focus on whether a firm is
likely to enter a market but for the merger. Instead, in both cases, the Court
corrected the lower courts for their failure to consider whether the firm in
question had a present procompetitive influence on the target market.110 In
the following case, however, the Court shifts its position under the perceived
potential competition theory, and proffers heightened standards under both
of the potential competition doctrine’s sub-theories.111
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, the U.S. challenged a
proposed merger between two commercial banks.112 The Court ultimately
prohibited the acquiring firm from engaging in a market it decided not to
enter de novo.113 “The acquiring bank, National Bank of Commerce (NBC),”
was a large bank based in Seattle and owned a subsidiary of the appellee,
Marine Bancorporation.114 This firm was the second largest bank
headquartered in the state, but had not yet been able to compete directly in
the Spokane metropolitan area.115 The acquired firm, Washington Trust
Bank (WTB), was a smaller bank in Spokane.116
The government argued that the proposed merger violated Section 7,
and argued its case under both sub-theories.117 Under the actual potential
competition theory, the government first argued that the merger would
eliminate the possibility of market deconcentration in the future since NBC
could enter the Spokane market without a merger.118 Under the perceived
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 526; FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 606–07.
Id. at 607.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 614–15.
Id. at 615.
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potential competition doctrine, the government argued that NBC’s perceived
presence on the fringe of the Spokane market had present procompetitive
effects.119
Without endorsing the actual potential competition theory,120 the Court
stated in dicta that if the government were to succeed under this theory,
“[t]wo essential preconditions must exist . . . : (i) that in fact NBC has
available feasible means for entering the Spokane market other than by
acquiring WTB; and (ii) that those means offer a substantial likelihood of
ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant
procompetitive effects.”121 Under the first prong, the Court found that state
law barriers precluded NBC from establishing a branch bank in Spokane de
novo,122 and suggested that that the only means that NBC could enter the
target market was through merger.123 Under the second prong, the Court
acknowledged that it is conceivable under state law that NBC may have been
able to acquire smaller banks within Spokane but determined that state law
limitations on NBC’s ability to grow those entities rendered any likely
procompetitive effects de minimis.124
Since the Court also rejected the government’s perceived potential
competition argument,125 the Marine Bancorporation case further highlights
the high evidentiary burdens that the FTC faces when arguing potential
competition cases. The government attempted to show that NBC was a
perceived potential entrant that exerted present-procompetitive effects on the
Spokane market by offering subjective evidence in the form of a
memorandum written by an NBC officer.126 The Court, however, dismissed
this evidence by stating that the opinions of officers of the acquiring bank,
and not the target bank, did not establish a violation of Section 7.127 The
Court instead applied an objective standard when gauging fringe effect, and
stated that since rational, “commercial bankers” in Spokane were aware of
the regulatory barriers that rendered NBC an unlikely or insignificant entrant
119
Id. The government also proffered a third argument, stating that WTB, as an
independent entity, would develop by internal expansion or mergers with other medium-size
banks into a regional, or ultimately state-wide, actual competitor of NBC and other large
banks. Id.
120
Id. at 639 (stating that the Court “express[es] no view on the appropriate resolution of
the question reserved in Falstaff” regarding the viability and means to resolve the actual
potential competition theory).
121
Id. at 633.
122
Id. at 629.
123
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 630.
124
Id. at 638.
125
Id. at 639–40.
126
Id. at 640. The note stated, “Spokane banks were likely to engage in price competition
as NBC approached their market.” Id.
127
Id.
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except by merger, “[i]t is improbable that NBC exerts any meaningful
procompetitive influence over Spokane banks by ‘standing in the wings.’”128
After an economic review of the market and concluding that no fringe effect
was evident, the Court used objective evidence pertaining to entry barriers
in order to make a subjective determination concerning firm perception.129
IV. THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY POST-MARINE
BANCORPORATION: A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD?
Admittedly, the FTC’s case in Marine Bancorporation was not strong.
The agency was not able to proffer any legitimate subjective evidence that
neatly showed target firm perception, nor was it able to objectively show,
through economic data, that NBC had a fringe effect on banks in Spokane.130
Still, the Marine Bancorporation case is important in the Court’s shift away
from focusing on the future anticompetitive effects of a merger, like in
Procter131 and Falstaff.132 Ultimately, however, the Court’s use of an
objective standard when gauging fringe effect undermines any incentive to
use the perceived potential competition doctrine.
Marine Bancorporation essentially requires that acquired firms, such
as Outback in the prior hypothetical, be actually capable of entering the
acquiring firm’s market, regardless of whether the company is already
exerting procompetitive influences, or whether the target market is overly
concentrated.133 This standard is puzzling, in that the present procompetitive
effects—the focus of the perceived potential competition doctrine—stem
from subjective perceptions rather than actual capabilities.
The objective standard the Court sets forth in Marine Bancorporation
essentially equates the perceived potential competition theory to the actual
potential competition theory by requiring that the acquired firm actually be
able to enter the target market, therefore discounting the possible existence
of strong subjective evidence.134 This issue is noticeable when considering
the following example: where evidence shows that firms in the target market
perceive the acquired firm as a potential entrant, but where objective
evidence of such perception (i.e., through economic data concerning fringe
effect) cannot be tied to those perceptions. This risks the possibility that any

128

Id. at 639–40.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 639–40.
130
Id. at 640–41.
131
See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
132
See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
133
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S at 625 (“[T]he acquiring firm’s premerger
presence on the fringe of the target market must have in fact tempered oligopolistic
behavior . . . .”).
134
See Turner, supra note 31; Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S at 625.
129
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present procompetitive effects an acquired firm has on a target market will
not be fleshed out or confirmed through objective evidence, despite
overwhelming subjective evidence that evinces the contrary.
Naturally, lower courts have struggled in creating consistent standards
for determining whether a wings effect exists.135 The Supreme Court in
Marine Bancorporation appeared to require direct evidence of such.136
Lower courts, however, namely those in the Second Circuit, are more
lenient.137 The Second Circuit requires only “at least circumstantial
evidence” that the fringe presence “probably directly affected competitive
activity in the market,” and does not compel plaintiffs to proffer any direct
evidence of procompetitive effects in the form of direct economic data.138
Other lower courts have even assumed that a fringe effect exists based on a
showing of certain objective factors.139 Again, the Second Circuit’s more
lenient standard under this analysis is more conducive to preserving the
economic benefits that may be had under the perceived potential competition
theory.140
In order to understand why the objective Marine Bancorporation
standard seems inconsistent with the basic premise of the perceived potential
competition doctrine, consider the case of scarecrows. Similar to how these
human-shaped objects can deceive birds from eating crops—despite being
unable to actually harm those birds—acquired firms can deter target-market
firms from raising prices despite not actually being able to enter the
market.141 Thus, simply because an acquired firm is not capable of entering
a market does not mean it fails to provide a valuable benefit worth
preserving—just like how a scarecrow is worth having, although it may not
actually be able to inflict harm on birds. Proponents of the Marine
Bancorporation standard may say that target-market participants are not as
naive as birds and have perfect perceptions regarding the financial
135

Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 640.
Id. at 625.
137
Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1982).
138
Id.
139
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1256–57 (C.D. Cal. 1973)
(“The objective evidence of record concerning Phillips’ capacity and motivation to enter the
market unilaterally, Phillips’ status as the most likely potential entrant, the small number of
other potential entrants, the feasibility of unilateral entry by Phillips, and the concentrated
nature of the market are legally sufficient to establish that Phillips’ entry into the market
through the Tidewater acquisition had substantial anticompetitive effects. It must necessarily
be assumed that the entry of an aggressive major company such as Phillips into such a market
on a unilateral basis would have conferred substantial competitive benefits which were lost
when it was allowed to step into the shoes of an established major factor in the market. The
substantiality of the anticompetitive effects of the Tidewater acquisition may be inferred from
the objective facts present here.”).
140
Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 355–56.
141
See Bush & Massa, supra note 19.
136
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capabilities and intent of acquired firms residing “on the wings.” The FTC
and DOJ have their doubts as to if these notions are true.142 If true, however,
then a subjective standard can only incentivize target-market firms to do their
research to ensure that they have every piece of necessary information.
This anomaly underlies the difficulties courts have with this doctrine.
Thus, prior to Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court recognized the
notion that firms do not always set prices in accordance to what the rational
market participant knows about potential entrants, by giving weight to
subjective evidence under the perceived potential competition theory.143 In
Marine Bancorporation, the Court objectified this analysis.144 The FTC
states, however, that firms may have misjudged perceptions about potential
entrants.145 So why would the Court impose a test that assumes target market
firms have perfect knowledge? If these firms are adjusting prices in
accordance to these misguided perceptions, beneficial effects may exist.146
Given antitrust law’s desire to keep markets competitive and prices low, we
should not disrupt target-market firms’ misperceptions about potential
entrants who are not actually capable of entering. In essence, an objective
standard presumes that scarecrows are only useful if they are actually
capable of harming the birds that may enter a field of crops. Thus, Marine
Bancorporation’s objective standard, which requires that acquired firms
actually be capable of entering the target market, is not warranted—just like
robotic scarecrows capable of injuring daring birds are not needed to
preserve crops.
Lower courts have consequently struggled with the objective standard,
that is, determining whether an acquired firm has the “characteristics,
capabilities and economic incentives to render it a perceived potential entrant
de novo.”147 This confusion has resulted in different standards across
circuits.148 Straying away from the heightened Marine Bancorporation
standard, lower courts have given varied degrees of weight to subjective
perceptions. This evidence often comes in the form of testimony from
executive officials within the target market regarding their perceptions of the
acquired firm, specifically to see whether they believe the acquired firm is
142

1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533–36 (1973). Falstaff had,
in press releases and company publications, expressed an interest in distributing its product
nationally; the Supreme Court stated that these pre-acquisition discussions were relevant in
concluding whether Falstaff was a perceived potential entrant.
144
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 638–40 (1974).
145
1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13 (stating that target-market “firms may misjudge the
entry advantages of a particular firm”).
146
See Bush & Massa, supra note 19.
147
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 624–25.
148
See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1058.
143
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one they think may enter the target market.149 The Second Circuit in Tenneco
found the acquired firm to be a “perceived potential competitor” under
element (i) by largely relying on the subjective perceptions of target market
participants, notwithstanding a lack of evidence that showed the acquired
firm had many of the “characteristics, capabilities, or incentives that” the
framework seems to require.150 Given the difficulty in gauging a wings
effect,151 subjective standards of this type are more desirable if agencies wish
to preserve any economic benefits from firm perception which may be had.
The objective standard under Marine Bancorporation, however, may
speak more to a method of proving proximate causation rather than an
unwarranted standard which only serves as a hurdle for the FTC. Other
courts, therefore, understandably narrow their focus on objective evidence,
no matter how strongly the subjective evidence alludes to the fact that
incumbent firms perceive the acquired firm to be a potential entrant.152
Thus, this Comment argues that the perceived potential competition
theory should not rest on whether the acquired firm is actually a “potential
competitor.” Rather, similar to the Second Circuit’s approach, the focus
should center on whether the acquired firm is perceived by firms in the target
market as being a “perceived potential entrant.”153 Thus, whether the
acquired firm actually intends to enter the target market should not be
controlling like it is under the actual potential competition theory, for the
reasons stated above.154 That being said, actual intent (e.g., public statements
149

See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 355–56 (2d Cir. 1982) (considering
testimony by industry executives as to whether they considered Tenneco, Inc. a potential
entrant admitted, along with evidence of negotiations, Tenneco’s financial strength, and
compatibility of products of the acquiring and acquired firm); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 75–78 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding FTC finding that Kennecott was a
perceived potential entrant based on testimony of competitors and evidence about the
company’s ability to enter the market).
150
Tenneco, 689 F. 2d at 353–56 (finding that the defendant could be considered a
perceived potential entrant because incumbent firms were not aware of its lack of success in
past attempts of entering market). See also Ginsburg v. InBev, 649 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947–52
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
finding that InBev was not a perceived potential entrant based on evidence that it had actively
withdrawn from the United States market and had entered into a long-term exclusive
distribution agreement by which its products were imported into and distributed within the
United States), aff’d on other grounds, 623 F.3d 1229 (8th Cir. 2010).
151
See Bush & Massa, supra note 19.
152
See, e.g., Mo. Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 863–64 (2d Cir.
1974).
153
A “perceived potential entrant” is a firm that is viewed by firms in the target market
as one that may enter the target market. See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1062.
154
Whether a firm intends to enter the market of the acquiring firm may not influence the
subjective perceptions of the firms in the target market. This element, however, is still
relevant in objectively determining whether rational firms in the target market view it as a
perceived potential entrant. See id.
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by the acquired company pre-merger) to enter a market may still be relevant
in deciding whether companies in the target market are changing their
behavior in response.
V. FTC V. STERIS CORPORATION: AN ECCENTRIC RULING IN THE
WAKE OF MARINE BANCORPORATION
This Comment now turns to an analysis of FTC v. Steris Corp. to review
the court’s discussion of the potential competition doctrine.155 Part V will
first present the facts of the case. Thereafter, this Comment will argue that
the FTC erred by not raising the perceived potential competition theory even
in light of the Marine Bancorporation standard. This Comment will then
argue that the perceived potential competition doctrine should be adjusted in
accordance with prior precedent given the result in Steris.
A. Facts
In 2015, the FTC sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction against Steris Corp. (Steris) for its proposed merger with another
leading sterilization provider, Synergy Health PLC (Synergy).156 Steris and
Synergy were the second and third largest firms in the contract sterilization
service market, which consisted of companies that contracted with
manufacturers to rid their products of unwanted microorganisms.157
Sterigenics Corp. (Sterigenics), a third party not involved in the proposed
merger, was the largest firm by size and revenue in the relevant market.158
At the time of the merger, the U.S. sterilization market consisted of
three methods of sterilization: gamma radiation, e-beam radiation, and
ethylene oxide (EO) gas.159 Although Synergy was the largest provider of ebeam services in the U.S., it did not have any competitive presence in the
U.S. market for the most well-regarded method of sterilization: gamma
radiation.160 Steris and Sterigenics held eighty-five percent of U.S. gamma
facilities and a bulk of the U.S. market share.161 This fact compelled Synergy
founder, Dr. Richard M. Steeves, to develop a plan which could assist
155

FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
Id.
157
Id. at 963–64.
158
Id. at 963.
159
Id. at 964. Customers, however, may choose sterilization methods based on their
products’ physical characteristics. Id.
160
Id. (“Gamma sterilization . . . is the most effective and economical option for most
healthcare products because of its penetration capabilities. It is the only viable option for
dense products (e.g., implantable medical devices) and products packaged in larger
quantities.”). Synergy did use gamma radiation; however, all of its facilities were located
overseas. Id.
161
Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 964, 967.
156
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Synergy in attracting gamma-using customers within the U.S.162 Steeves
identified what he believed was an “industry trend” of companies switching
from gamma to x-ray sterilization services after a major product
manufacturer engaged in this switch.163 This motivated Steeves to purchase
Daniken Corp., a Swiss x-ray sterilization provider.164 Steeves made the
purchase with the ultimate goal of implementing commercialized x-ray
sterilization in the U.S. market, which, according to the FTC, was a viable
alternative to gamma radiation for its “‘possibly superior’ depth of
penetration and turnaround times.”165
Following the purchase of Daniken, Steeves presented his plan to the
Board of Directors in 2012.166 Steeves recognized numerous issues Synergy
needed to overcome for x-ray sterilization to be successfully implemented in
the U.S., which consisted of: (1) building facilities within the U.S. at a costeffective price; (2) overcoming customer reluctance in switching from
gamma to x-ray radiation; and (3) securing customer commitments in the
form of financial backing.167 By the fall of 2014, Synergy was successful in
securing non-binding “letters of interest” from a number of large
customers.168 Synergy, however, was unable to secure any financial backing
in the form of “take-or-pay contracts,” which appeared necessary if the plan
were to ultimately be approved.169
In October of 2014, Steris publicly announced its plans to merge with
Synergy.170 Despite this development, Synergy’s x-ray plan continued
“unabated” for a three-month period following the announcement.171 During
this time, Synergy expressed optimism regarding the plan in a few statements
that were made public.172 Specifically, Synergy announced that one of its
major customers secured “[Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)]
approval of a Class III medical device . . . paving the way for further
conversions,” and that an exclusive agreement with a manufacturer of x-ray
equipment would allow it “to get started with x-ray in the U.S.”173 Synergy’s

162

Id. at 966–967.
Id. at 964, 967.
164
Id. at 967.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 968.
167
Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 971.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 978, 981 (stating that little risk for the project could be tolerated since the plan
to implement x-ray sterilization in the United States would take up a significant portion of
Synergy’s budget, thus forcing it to forgo other investment opportunities).
170
Id. at 973.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 974.
173
Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 974.
163
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failure in securing customer commitments via take-or-pay contracts
continued, however, and in February of 2015, Synergy informed the FTC
that it was cancelling its x-ray plans due to this financial shortcoming.174
B. Arguments and Ruling
The FTC argued that the merger should be barred under the actual
potential competition theory, insisting that but for the transaction, Synergy,
a United Kingdom-based company, would not have discontinued its plan to
compete directly for customers with Steris by introducing commercialized
x-ray sterilization services to the U.S..175 The FTC contended that the merger
barred future procompetitive benefits that would have resulted when
Synergy entered the U.S. market—an event that the agency insisted was
likely to occur but for the merger taking place.176
The district court denied the FTC’s motion for preliminary injunction,
finding that the FTC “failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that
[the FTC] is likely to succeed on the merits in the upcoming administrative
trial.”177 Crucially, the FTC did not employ the perceived potential
competition doctrine when arguing the merger’s unlawfulness. Rather, the
FTC chose to solely argue under the actual potential competition theory.178
After preliminary hearings, the court further narrowed the case’s focus to
only one issue under the actual competition theory, which was, “whether,
absent the acquisition, the evidence shows that Synergy probably would have
entered the U.S. contract sterilization market by building one or more x-ray
facilities within a reasonable period of time.”179
In addition to noting the technical difficulties companies would have in
switching from gamma to x-ray sterilization,180 the driving factors behind the
court’s ruling were (1) Synergy’s failure to secure financial commitments
from customers, and (2) “its inability to lower capital costs” involved with
the project.181 Thus, the district court concluded that future competition
between the two firms was unlikely, based largely on the fact that the FTC
failed to show that Synergy’s plan was financially feasible and capable of
174

Id. at 976.
Id. at 964, 966.
176
Id. at 964 (“Synergy’s planned x-ray sterilization facilities would have targeted Steris’
and Sterigenics’ gamma sterilization customers, providing them with options for contract
sterilization and resulting in lower prices and improved quality.”).
177
Id. at 984.
178
Id. at 966.
179
Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 966.
180
Id. at 982–83 (stating that companies would have to go through many regulatory
hurdles, which included conducting studies and tests, seeking FDA approval, and analyzing
the costs associated with the switch).
181
Id. at 984.
175
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positive implementation in the near future.182
VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Court’s Decision
The court viewed many of the same factors in its analysis that the
Supreme Court applied in Marine Bancorporation when deciding whether
Synergy was likely to enter the U.S. market.183 Specifically, the Steris court
focused on objective criteria and emphasized Synergy’s financial positioning
in deciding whether it had “the available feasible means” of entry.184 Despite
finding against the government, the court seemed to apply a lower standard
under the actual potential competition theory by requiring only that the FTC
show that Synergy “probably would have entered.”185 This method of
analysis may therefore suggest that although the court applied a lenient
standard, it still used a heightened test.186 Again, this is evident in the court’s
focus on objective evidence regarding Synergy’s financial shortcomings,
rather than subjective evidence, such as Synergy’s public announcements
about its equipment manufacturing agreement and customer interest.187
The court relied heavily on the FTC in ultimately determining to focus
its analysis on the actual potential competition doctrine.188 Neither the
court’s opinion nor supplementary documents extend any explanation for
why the FTC chose not to bring the claim on perceived potential competition
grounds,189 which begs the question of why the FTC decided not to argue its
case under this sub-theory.
B. Analyzing the FTC’s Strategy
The FTC decided not to bring the perceived potential competition
doctrine for reasons not stated in the opinion.190 Therefore, why the agency
did not also argue that the merger was unlawful because it potentially
removed present procompetitive effects on the U.S. market is unclear.

182

Id.
See id. at 962.
184
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 602 (1974)
(discussing the actual potential competition doctrine).
185
But see FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 300 (4th Cir. 1977) (requiring a
showing of “clear proof” of entry under the actual potential competition theory).
186
Thomas N. Dahdouh, 2015: A Year of Big Plaintiff Wins in Antitrust and Privacy
Cases, 25 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST, UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 38, 58–61
(2016).
187
See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 982–84.
188
Id. at 966.
189
See id.
190
Id.
183
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Instead, the FTC’s reliance on the actual potential competition theory
ultimately forced the agency to argue that Synergy was likely to enter the
U.S. market—a burden that it was unable to overcome. Before scrutinizing
the FTC for not bringing the perceived potential competition theory, it is
important to analyze the framework the FTC uses to decide under which
theories to pursue the claims.
1. Was the FTC Justified in Bringing the Claim?
The 1984 Merger Guidelines proscribe the framework agencies should
follow when determining whether to bring a claim, as well as what theories
they should proffer.191 When first considering whether a claim is justified,
the Merger Guidelines employ a “single structural analysis” when gauging
mergers that may present either type of harm.192 This analysis considers a
list of objective factors that direct agencies to evaluate the harmful effects a
specific merger may present, and if they are severe enough to justify a
challenge to the merger.193 These factors include: market concentration,
conditions of entry generally, the acquiring firm’s entry advantage, the
market share of the acquired firm, and efficiencies.194 The Merger Guidelines
then consolidate this approach into three requirements: (1) the target market
must be concentrated;195 (2) entry into the target market must not be
“generally easy;”196 and (3) the potential entrant must be uniquely
advantaged to enter the target market.197
After considering this approach, it is hard to say that the FTC did not
have sound reasons to bring a claim. The U.S. market for contract
sterilization services was essentially controlled by two firms: Steris and
Sterigenics, who together controlled an overwhelming percentage of the
market.198 Thus, the first element (target market concertation) within the
FTC’s structural analysis is met without question. Since the FTC ultimately
did bring the claim, it is presumptively sound to state that it believed
elements two (entry barriers) and three (unique advantages to entry) were
attainable as well—the contract sterilization certainly contained high entry
191

1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.
See id. at § 4.13.
193
Id.
194
See id. at §§ 4.131–135.
195
Agencies use the Herfindhal Hirschman Index (HHI) when gauging market
concentration and are “unlikely” to challenge a merger unless the index exceeds 1800. Id. at
§ 4.131
196
Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1085 (“As the ease of entry increases, incumbent
firms are less likely to raise their price in response to an acquisition involving potential
entrants because other firms could easily become producers in the market if prices rose
modestly.”).
197
1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.
198
FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 964 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
192
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barriers, and it can easily be argued that Synergy was uniquely positioned to
enter the target market relative to other companies.
2. Should the FTC Have Argued Under the Perceived
Potential Competition Theory?
After deciding to ultimately bring a claim, the Merger Guidelines then
advise the agencies as to which theory under the potential competition
doctrine is most likely implicated.199 Specifically, the Merger Guidelines
recognize that both the actual and perceived potential competition theories
serve distinct functions, which become implicated based on the positioning
of the firms and the nature of their markets.200 In describing the relationship
between the two theories, the 1984 Merger Guidelines state:
If it were always profit-maximizing for incumbent firms to set
price in such a way that all entry was deterred and if information
and coordination were sufficient to implement this strategy, harm
to perceived potential competition would be the only competitive
problem to address. In practice, however, actual potential
competition has independent importance. Firms already in the
market may not find it optimal to set price low enough to deter all
entry; moreover, those firms may misjudge the entry advantages
of a particular firm and, therefore, the price necessary to deter its
entry.201
Thus, the Guidelines state that present procompetitive effects via lower
prices are not always present due to the misconstrued perceptions of
incumbent firms.202 This fact, according to the FTC, gives the actual
potential competition theory separate and distinct importance.203
Given this section of the Guidelines, it is foreseeable that the FTC
believed Steris and Sterigenics had misconstrued perceptions of Synergy as
a potential competitor, or that they just simply did not “find it optimal to set
prices low enough to deter new entry.”204 In other words, the agency may
not have argued under the perceived potential competition doctrine because
it did not have sufficient data showing that Synergy’s position on the edge
of the market had a present procompetitive effect on the U.S. sterilization
market.

199
200
201
202
203
204

1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13.
Id.
See id. at §4.12 (emphasis added).
“Incumbent firms” in the Steris case would be Steris and Sterigenics.
1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 25.
Id.
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Although the court’s opinion does not outline the conditions of the U.S.
sterilization market, evidence does show that Synergy’s customers were
interested in the idea of x-ray sterilization.205 This could lead to the
conclusion that prices in the market were high to begin with.206 The
stronghold that the incumbent firms had on the market, however, along with
their ability to continually raise prices, should have been enough to bar the
merger—that is, if the FTC were to balance the other factors.
Overall, the strategy of bringing only one potential competition claim
is inconsistent with the fact that agencies often employ both the actual and
perceived potential competition theories when litigating potential
competition cases.207 In fact, courts have considered instances where only
one theory is addressed to be somewhat unusual.208 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has taken the initiative multiple times in cases where only
one theory was alleged, and has remanded lower court rulings for further
findings under the perceived potential competition theory.209
The evidentiary incentives for agencies to bring a claim under both
theories are substantial since it may permit a wider range of evidence—
specifically, that which concerns both the future and present effects that a
given merger has on the target market.210 Thus, if the FTC litigated the
perceived potential competition claim, it would have been able to probe into
205

FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 971 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
Id. at 973 (considering testimony concerning interest for new sterilization method
because of high prices with gamma radiation).
207
See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (involving both
aspects of the potential entrant theory). As recently as 2010, the FTC found a consummated
merger was illegal in one market and that liability could have been premised on either of the
two perceived potential competition theories. In re Polypore Int’l, Inc., 2010 FTC LEXIS 97,
at *72 n.41 (2010).
208
See FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293 n.6 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[The] FTC has
not argued that the perceived or fringe effect potential entrant theory is applicable here, most
likely due to the long lead time for successful entry. [The] FTC’s claim to relief is therefore
somewhat unique in that most decisions which have considered the potential entrant theory
have usually confronted both aspects of that theory and not solely the actual potential entrant
theory. As a consequence, it is difficult to extract from those cases the component that is
applicable to the instant case. The task is not lightened by the fact it is the perceived potential
entrant theory which has been the accepted one.”).
209
See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); see also FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (where the Court remanded back to the lower
court for a finding on perceived potential competition grounds).
210
This may also result in potential spillover during discovery, where evidence pertaining
to one theory may assist in showing another. For example, there may be an instance where
because only one theory is alleged, only one discovery process pertaining to one theory is less
likely. This limits the ability for discovery to mostly matters that concern the acquired firm’s
financial capabilities and likelihood of entering the target market. It is foreseeable though
that if both theories are alleged, perceptions of the acquired firm along with its competitors
would be discoverable, and thus able to assist some aspects of the actual potential competition
theory even though those inquiries were not initially seen as relevant.
206
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the subjective evidence of firms in the U.S. market to see whether the market
perceived Synergy as a likely entrant, and further, if this perception had any
present procompetitive effect on the U.S. market. Based on the holdings in
Procter, Falstaff, and Penn-Olin, the district court in Steris could have, and
arguably should have, considered whether Synergy exerted any considerable
influence on the wings of the U.S. market. These non-binding guidelines,
however, have since served as a replacement for judicial discretion—giving
administrative agencies a position of dominance when asserting guidelinebased arguments in federal courts.211
C. Could the FTC Have Succeeded Under the Perceived Potential
Competition Theory?
An analysis of the Steris facts using the original test given by El Paso212
would likely lead to the conclusion that the merger would have been barred.
Again, the Supreme Court in El Paso held that Pacific Northwest had a
procompetitive impact on competition in the California market because they
were on the “wings” of that market, notwithstanding the fact that Pacific
Northwest never entered the California market, nor was it able show that it
was likely to enter in the future.213 Synergy was similar to Pacific Northwest
in many respects. Like Pacific Northwest, Synergy had financial
shortcomings and other barriers which precluded it from immediately
entering the market.214 But, the Ohio court did not take these factors into
account since the merger was viewed under the more stringent actual
potential competition theory.
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin also addressed a multitude of factors
that were not given consideration in the Steris case due to the district court’s
failure to apply the perceived potential competition doctrine.215 Although
the Court in Penn-Olin did not extend a preference of any one factor over the
other, its description of the type of firm that raises antitrust concerns under
the perceived potential competition theory seems to resemble a company
similar to Synergy. Specifically, the Court in Penn-Olin stated, “the
existence of an aggressive, well-equipped and well financed corporation
engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter
211

See generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006).
212
United States v. El Paso, 376 U.S. 651 (1964); see supra notes 70–76 and
accompanying text.
213
El Paso, 376 U.S. at 657–58 (“[T]he findings that Pacific Northwest, as an
independent entity, could not have obtained a contract from the California distributors, could
not have received the gas supplies or financing for a pipeline project to California, or could
not have put together a project acceptable to the regulatory agencies . . . are irrelevant.”).
214
Id.
215
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176 (1964).
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an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition
which cannot be underestimated.”216
The only shortcoming that the Ohio court may have found with this
description concerns the court’s finding that Synergy was unable to secure
customer commitments and ultimately lower its capital costs.217 But the
perceived potential competition doctrine under earlier Supreme Court
precedent did not solely rely on whether the firm had the actual financial
capability to enter.218 Synergy was also by no means a struggling firm which
should not be considered “well-financed.”219 Synergy had a considerable
budget of $40 million for investment purposes, 220 while being situated as the
third-largest firm in their market.221 The finding that Synergy may have not
been able to implement a complicated strategy within a short amount of time
should not discredit the fact that it is well-financed (being the third largest
company and worth over $500 million), aggressive (evidenced by the fact
that Steeves even entertained this plan, and coupled with the fact that he
purchased Daniken to make it feasible), engaged in a similar market (contract
sterilization services), and in an oligopolistic market (competition with Steris
and Sterigenics in the U.S. market).222 Thus, the FTC under the rationale
proffered by Penn-Olin, could have—at a minimum—pursued a compelling
argument that Synergy was a perceived potential entrant.
In further applying the factors that the Court found relevant in PennOlin, for gauging the precise competitive harm, the nature of the market
certainly favors the FTC’s approach, had it employed the perceived potential
competition argument. The entire contract sterilization market was
essentially controlled by three companies: Steris, Sterigenics, and
Synergy.223 Thus, the anticompetitive harm that results from this merger
includes that the Court considered in Procter, since new entrants will be
dissuaded from competing in an even more concentrated U.S. contract
sterilization market because of the merger between Steris and Synergy.224
In Falstaff, the Court alluded to the notion that the public
announcements of interest exerted by the acquiring firm made it likely that
216

Id. at 174.
See FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 963 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
218
See El Paso, 367 U.S. at 657–58 (finding that Pacific Northwest’s financial plan to
enter the market was irrelevant).
219
See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 962.
220
Id. at 981.
221
Id.
222
C.f. id. at 963.
223
See id.
224
See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (finding anticompetitive
effect in the consequence of new entrants be dissuaded from entering the market if Clorox
and Procter Gamble were to merge).
217
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firms in the target market were expecting their entry, thus changing their
behavior in the market.225 In Steris, it was easily foreseeable that the plan to
enter the U.S. market instituted by Synergy could have influenced Steris’ and
Sterigenics’ market behavior in the U.S. Numerous firms expressed interest
in the plan, and Synergy advertised this plan to a large audience while trying
to gain customer commitments.226 Thus, it seems as if subjective evidence
regarding firm perceptions in the U.S. market would have strongly favored
the FTC, that is, if the FTC gave itself the chance to argue that Synergy was
seen as a perceived potential entrant by firms in the U.S. market.
Whether the Court would have found the presence of a fringe effect is
unknown. This would depend on: (1) the type of evidence that is revealed
in discovery; and (2) whether the Court gives more weight to objective or
subjective evidence. Under the Marine Bancorporation standard, objective
evidence carried the day.227 The Court in Marine Bancorporation used an
objective standard regarding what a “rational banker” with perfect
information believed.228 It ultimately came to the conclusion that there was
no present competitive effect since the rational banker most likely knew of
the barriers to entry, and therefore would not perceive the firm as a potential
entrant after considering such.229 In Steris, there were also numerous entry
barriers: financing the project, customers gaining FDA approval, getting
customers to switch from gamma, and, most crucially, hoping that the
equipment manufacturers develop a machine that can support the x-ray
radiation.230 Thus, if the Court applied the Marine Bancorporation test to a
tee, it most likely would not have found that Steris had a fringe effect on the
market, since the prospects of effectuating Steris’ plan were ultimately slim,
and “rational” firms in the sterilization market would be assumed to be aware
of all of this information. An objective test, however, is not always applied,
and it is certainly foreseeable based on lower court rulings that the district
court could have used a subjective standard.
If there was some showing of subjective evidence that could have
revealed that Synergy did, in fact, have an effect on the target market, then
subjective evidence could have enabled the court to overlook the objective
evidence of Synergy’s financial capabilities. Further, if the court applied a
standard that assumed fringe effect, Synergy would not have to worry about
this element altogether.231
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526, 532 (1973).
See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
See Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 639–40.
Id.
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1256–1257 (C.D. Cal.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The court’s decision in Steris has broad implications for the legal
community. On its face, the Steris decision exemplifies how some of the
largest firms in extremely concentrated industries can avoid antitrust
enforcement. Specifically, the Steris case shows how the Supreme Court’s
failure to use a subjective test under the perceived potential competition
doctrine, like the Second Circuit’s, has possibly influenced enforcement
agencies to not bring their cases under the theory at all. This phenomenon
is not only historically unusual, but also concerning for antitrust agencies
who may feel compelled to now bring cases under the more stringent actual
potential competition theory. If a trend away from concentration is what
antitrust law and its enforcement agencies most desire, then a change in the
guidelines should correct for Marine Bancorporation’s evidentiary hurdles
under the potential competition doctrine.

1973) (“The objective evidence of record concerning Phillips’ capacity and motivation to
enter the market unilaterally, Phillips’ status as the most likely potential entrant, the small
number of other potential entrants, the feasibility of unilateral entry by Phillips, and the
concentrated nature of the market are legally sufficient to establish that Phillips’ entry into
the market through the Tidewater acquisition had substantial anticompetitive effects. It must
necessarily be assumed that the entry of an aggressive major company such as Phillips into
such a market on a unilateral basis would have conferred substantial competitive benefits
which were lost when it was allowed to step into the shoes of an established major factor in
the market. The substantiality of the anticompetitive effects of the Tidewater acquisition may
be inferred from the objective facts present here.”).

